Blog del Foro de Habeas Data - América del norte

Fallos sobre anonimato de usuario de blogspot - Libertad de expresión

Tue, 15 Jan 2008 10:13:49 -0800

In the Matter of the Application Pursuant to CPLR 3102 of Pamela Greenbaum, Petitioner, against Google, Inc. d/b/a Blogger and Blogspot.com, Re-spondent.

102063/07

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY

2007 NY Slip Op 27448; 18 Misc. 3d 185; 845 N.Y.S.2d 695; 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7274

October 23, 2007, Decided

COUNSEL: [ 1] For Petitioner: Adam B. Feder, Esq., Feder and Rodney, P.L.L.C., Brooklyn, NY.

Respondent Google, Tonia Ouellette Klausner, Esq., Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, New York, NY.

Respondent "Orthomom", Paul Alan Levy, Esq., Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC.

Caso Shoars v Epson

Thu, 28 Sep 2006 14:00:37 -0700

http://www.law.seattleu.edu/fachome/chonm/Cases/shoars.html

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIASECOND APPELLATE DISTRICTDIVISION TWO

No. B 073234

ALANA SHOARS,Plaintiff and Appellant

EPSON AMERICA, INC.,Defendant and Respondent.April 14, 1994

1) Plaintiff Alana Shoars appeals from summary judgment in favor of defendant Epson America, Inc. (Epson) in her action for wrongful discharge and slander. We affirm the summary disposition of the first cause of action but reverse with respect to the latter.[FN1]

FN1. When it appeared that a cross-complaint between the parties might still be pending, we requested supplemental information and briefing on the question of appellate jurisdiction. (See California Dental Assn. v. California Dental Hyaienists' Assn. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 49, 58-60.) In response, Epson apprised us that although its municipal court action against plaintiff had been consolidated with this case, before entry of judgment the parties had stipulated that the cross-action be dismissed -- without prejudice, and subject to refiling in the event of reversal here. Although the latter provisos could be construed as an effort to contrive an appealable judgment (see id. at pp. 58-59), we conclude that we do have jurisdiction over this appeal, inasmuch as the originally independent cross-action has been dismissed, and there is no assurance it would arise again in this action.

The Right to Privacy - Warren & Brandeis

Tue, 04 Jul 2006 17:01:44 -0700

The Right to Privacy
Warren and Brandeis

Harvard Law Review.
Vol. IV December 15, 1890 No. 5
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY[*] .

"It could be done only on principles of private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience, which, when applied to a new subject, make common law without a precedent; much more when received and approved by usage." — Willes, J., in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2312

That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis. Then the "right to life" served only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property secured to the individual his lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life, -- the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to comprise every form of possession -- intangible, as well as tangible.

Interview with Chris Hoofnagle

Tue, 04 Jul 2006 06:18:31 -0700

Interview with Chris Hoofnagle

Chris Jay Hoofnagle is a privacy expert and lawyer admitted to practice law in California and DC. Currently, he is non-residential fellow at Stanford University's Center for Internet and Society and a consultant on privacy litigation. Until recently he worked at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, where he was in charge of the organization of EPIC West Coast Office. He had testified before Congress, the California Legislature, and before the Judicial Conference of the United States on various privacy issues. His academic articles on the First Amendment and privacy are online at the SSRN web site.